Abstract: -This study investigates all variations of the He's digital signature scheme based on factoring and discrete logarithms. In contrast to three modular exponentiation computation, the optimal two schemes of generalized He's signature verification reveals that only two modular exponentiation is needed for signature verification.
Introduction
The first digital signature scheme was proposed in 1978 by RSA [1] . RSA's security assumption was based on the complexities of factoring (FAC) a large composite integer n=p*q, where p and q are two distinct large primes. ElGamal [2] proposed an alternative digital signature scheme in 1985, with a security assumption based on solving the discrete logarithm (DL) problem. These two digital signature schemes have been adopted as worldwide standards and applied in many different cryptographic applications [3] .
The FAC or DL signature scheme may however be insecure if the security assumption does not exist in the future. To enhance security assumption, Harn [4] first proposed a digital signature scheme based on FAC and DL simultaneously that achieved the same moduli size as the FAC and DL assumptions. Lee [5] noted that unfortunately "hackers" could forge the signatures with high probabilities if they solve the DL problem. Lee [5] proposed a modified scheme with enhanced security that promised the degree of security originally claimed. These two schemes [4, 5] however, unlike the ElGamal [2] have the same modulus, requiring more keys for each user to distribute and store. To improve upon this shortcoming, He [6] proposed another scheme to enhance the original ElGamal signature scheme security. Harn [7] , Lee [8] and Tiersma [9] have shown however that He's scheme is not secure if the DL problem is solved. Shao [10] proposed two signature schemes in 1998 with a security assumption based on FAC and DL simultaneously, though Li [11] and Lee [12] subsequently showed that Shao's scheme was not as secure as claimed.
To overcome the weakness of Shao's scheme, He [13] proposed a signature scheme that achieved the previously described advantages, notably: (1) It is based on two hard problems; (2) uses the same modulus; and (3) only requires one pair of public and private keys. This study investigates all variations of He's signature scheme, in which security is based on FAC and DL. The optimal two variations investigated need only two modular exponentiation for signature verification. This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the original He's signature scheme, Section 3 describes the design of generalized He's signature schemes. Conclusions are made in Section 4.
Review of He's Signature Scheme [13]
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Meta-He Digital Signature Schemes
This section develops a complete list of 8 He-type digital signature schemes. The symbols m, P, g, R, x, y, t, 1 r and 2 r are reused as described in Section 2. All public and private keys are generated using the same conditions and equations of the He's signature scheme. Three symbols are set as follows: R mod 
where (a, b, c) are three parameters from (m, s), or a mathematical combination. The parameter a for example, can be m, s, or ms. The form of the generalized signature generating equation is now examined, and some restrictions on (a, b, c) based on security considerations are examined.
( with m is a valid signature, so that s and H should be included in the signature equation and can be used in parameters (a, b, c). (3) Eqn.9 always contains five parameters: two parameters are public information and three parameters are secret numbers. We can be sure that the number of secret parameters will always be larger than the number of equations available to the attacker, and so the generalized signature equation is secure, like the original He's scheme [13] . According to the above discussion, if the difference between the signed symbols + and -in eqn.9 is ignored, all the possible variations of He's digital signature schemes in Table 1 can be designed and listed. 
Conclusions
Eight variations of He's digital signature scheme has been investigated, and all achieve the following advantages: (1) based on FAC and DL assumptions simultaneously; (2) use same modulus; (3) require only one pair of public and private keys. This paper's proposed two optimal schemes show that two modular exponentiations are enough for signature verification.
